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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
Case No. 16610 
BETTY J. BLACK, et al., 
Defendants-
Respondent. 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable Christine M. Durham, District Judge 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant Utah 
Mortgage Loan Company ("Utah Mortgage") to recover Thirty-
eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-six Dollars and Forty-
three Cents ($38,476.43) (R. 4) or Thirty-six Thousand Seven 
Hundred Sixty Dollars and One Cent ($36,760.01) (R. 26 and 
Appellant's Brief, p. 3) principal--plaintiff's version of 
the correct amount has varied from time to time with the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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former amount claimed in its Complaint and the latter in its 
Brief--plus interest thereon from defendants-respondent. 
Plaintiff claims that the above sum represents the unpaid 
principal balance on a Six Hundred Seventy-five Thousand 
Seven Hundred Fifteen Dollar ($675,715.00) loan, secured by a 
real estate trust deed, which it made to Betty J. (Mrs. Don 
J.) Black, the late Don J. Black and Don J. Black Realty, 
Inc. (hereinafter collectively "the Blacks") on June 26, 
1975. R. 2. The Blacks denied that any portion of the loan 
remained unpaid and further contended that plaintiff's claim 
was barred in any event by the One-Action Rule. R. 9-11. 
Summary judgment has been entered in defendants' favor (R. 
68-69) and plaintiff appeals. 
1. The Subject Transaction. It is undisputed 
that plaintiff did lend $675,715.00 to the Blacks, on a deed 
of trust note, on or about June 26, 1975 1 for a term of 
eighteen months at interest of ten percent (10%) or two 
percent (2%) above First Security Bank of Utah's prime 
1
Appellant's suggestion that Mr. and Mrs. Black 
were sureties, rather than principals (App. Br., pp. 17-20) 
is an assertion which plaintiff devised for the first time 
on appeal without any foundation in the record. Mr. and 
Mrs. Black appear on the note as borrowers and principals, 
not as sureties or guarantors. R. 4. Indeed, the Complaint 
describes them as principals (claiming that Mr. and Mrs. 
Black "made executed and delivered to plaintiff their Deed 
of Trust Note." R. 2) and nowhere refers to them as anything 
but borrowers. The characterization of them as guarantors 
is an entirely novel notion which surfaced for the first 
time in Utah Mortgage's brief on appeal. 
2 
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rate, the rate to be adjusted month to month. R. 4. It 
further is undisputed that the loan was secured by a real 
estate trust deed, with power of sale and assignment of costs 
(R. 16-17), which was in the nature of a mortgage. The deed 
conveyed to McGhie Land Title Company, Utah Mortgage's trustee, 
land which had an appraised value of Eight Hundred Ninety-
four Thousand Dollars ($894,000.00). R. 25. 
Plaintiff claims that $38,476.43 or $36,760.01 of 
the $675,715.00 principal has not been paid (R. 3); the 
Blacks claim that the loan was paid in full. R. 10. 2 How-
ever, the other details of the Utah Mortgage-Black transactions 
are clear and not in dispute: The mortgaged property had 
been purchased for subdividing. A subdivision in fact was 
created and the land was sold on a lot-by-lot basis. The 
trust deed provided that, at Utah Mortgage's sole election, 
the property could be released piecemeal, upon payment of a 
2Appellant's statement at page 3 of its Brief that 
"[a]ccording to the uncontradicted affidavit of Craig D. 
Anderson, one of Utah Mortgage's loan officers, the unpaid 
balance of the loan is $36, 760. 01 (R. 25 (§2))" is misleading. 
That allegation is denied by the Answer. R. 10. Further, 
the claim would have been denied by affidavit, had Mr. 
Anderson's affidavit been served early enough for a response. 
(The affidavit was received by defendants' counsel very 
shortly before the hearing on the pending Motion for Summary 
Judgment.) Defendant did file an affidavit of counsel, 
pursuant to the terms of UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(f), stating that 
Mrs. Black, the only person who could prepare an affidavit 
on personal knowledge, was unavailable to respond to the 
Anderson affidavit on such short notice. R. 52. 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
suitable share of the loan. 3 R. 17; App. Br., p. 6. It 
appears from the record that Utah Mortgage was free to set 
any release price it chose. (In fact, Utah Mortgage exercis~ 
that discretion by varying the release price to maintain 
what it considered a satisfactory cash flow. R. 26.) The 
trustee, on Utah Mortgage's instructions, released lots to 
the Blacks' purchasers, retaining Five Thousand Two Hundred 
Dollars ($5,200.00) to Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($5,500.00) of the purchase price from each sale. Ibid. By 
Utah Mortgage's calculations, a per-lot release price of 
$5,200.00 represented 115% of each lot's pro rata share of the 
loan amount. Ibid. In other words, the number of lots in 
the mortgaged property times $5,200.00 would have exceeded 
the loan amount by 15%; the $5,500.00 release price was even 
more favorable to plaintiff. Because the property's appraised 
value of $894,000.00--even before improvement and subdivision 
increased its value--was 30% higher than the amount of the 
loan (R. 25), Utah Mortgage could have withheld an even 
higher release price, had it so desired. In any event, the 
trustee eventually released all the lots in the subdivision 
on Utah Mortgage's instructions. R. 19, 30. 
3 . f The parties' "agreement" to lot-by-lot release o 
the mortgaged property, of which appellant att;mpts to ma~e 
much, consisted of the Blacks' agreement that [a]t any time 
and from time to time upon written request of [Utah Mortgage] 
••• , the Trustee [McGhie Land Title Company] may ..• reco~veY 
••. all or part of the property." R. 17. The "agreement 
gave Utah Mortgage complete discretion to release the land 
on any basis it desired. 
4 
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There is no dispute as to the following material 
facts: 
1. All releases of the mortgaged property were 
made by the trustee at Utah Mortgage's request and withou~ 
fraud. R. 43. 
2. Utah Mortgage did not foreclose upon the 
collateral before corrunencing litigation against the Blacks on 
the trust deed note. Ibid. 
3. There has been no showing or indication that 
the value of the mortgaged real estate was insufficient for 
Utah Mortgage to have realized the property's full value 
through foreclosure. Indeed, the only evidence before the 
Court concerning the property's value indicated--without 
question by any party--that the property, even before 
subdivision, which naturally would have increased its value, 
was worth at least thirty percent (30%) more than the amount. 
R. 25. 
4. Utah Mortgage's right to demand any payment it 
chose as a condition of releasing lots was unrestricted. R. 
17. It could and did vary the release price to suit its 
perception of necessary cash flow. R. 26. 
5. A release price of even $5,200 per lot would 
have been more than sufficient to retire the loan, had Utah 
Mortgage collected that price on each lot. Ibid. 
5 
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6. There is no allegation or evidence that Utah 
Mortgage's failure to collect the full amount of the loan or, 
alternatively, to retain the land was caused by any act of 
the Blacks. 
Respondents contend that there is no remaining 
indebtedness on the note. R. 10. Utah Mortgage claims that 
$38,467.43 (R. 3) or $36,760.01 (R. 26)--the amount varies, 
depending upon which of plaintiff's papers one reads--of the 
loan's $675,715 principal amount was unpaid. Utah Mortgage 
apparently claims that it somehow lost track of the loan 
balance and released all the mortgaged lots before the loan 
had been paid off. If Utah Mortgage's claim is true, it 
perpetrated a bizarre oversight, consisting essentially of 
an inability to count. 
Appellant has made no real attempt to justify its 
conduct. It simply asserts, at page 3 of its Brief: 
Because of various cost overruns, delays 
and unforeseen expenses, the amount 
required to complete the project, and 
the corresponding funds disbursed from 
the loan amount[,] exceeded the fair 
market value of the lots comprising 
the project. (R. 26 n17).) 
This statement simply does not make sense and appellant, 
apparently perceiving its silliness, does not try to ration-
alize it. Utah Mortgage had lent $675,715; if it had required 
payment of $5 ,200 against the loan as a condition of releasing 
6 
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each lot in the subdivision, one of two events would have 
occurred: the loan would have been paid off in full long 
before the last lot was released, or the lots would not have 
been released and appellant could have foreclosed upon tnem. 
Only two conclusions logically can be drawn from Utah Mortgage's 
conduct: either the loan in fact has been paid off and Utah 
Mortgage has filed an unfounded lawsuit or some Utah Mortgage 
employee has perpetrated an act of extreme negligence and 
oversight which the company seeks to expiate by this action. 
2. The Parties' Positions. The Blacks answered 
the Complaint, denying that there was any unpaid balance on 
Utah Mortgage's note. R. 9-11. Shortly afterward, they 
moved for summary judgment, on the ground that plaintiff's 
action was barred by the "One-Action Rule" (UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-31-1 (1976 Repl. Vol.)) and plaintiff's reconveyance of 
the encumbered property. R. 14-15. Defendant resisted the 
Motion and filed a purported Motion for Summary Judgment of 
its own. That Motion, however, sought judgment only as to 
the Blacks' Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Defenses, not 
judgment upon plaintiff's claim. R. 20. The Blacks resisted 
plaintiff's Motion on various grounds, including that it was 
untimely, having been served less than ten days before the 
date set for hearing (in violation of UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)), 
that its supporting affidavits did not conform to the requirements 
7 
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of UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e), and that it did not seek judgment 
upon any claim of the Complaint. R. 49. The tardiness of 
plaintiff's Motion made a more substantive response impractical, 
The Motions came before the Court on the parties' 
papers, affidavits and oral argument on June 29, 1979. 
Prior to the hearing, defendants pointed out, by their 
papers, that the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson (which, by 
the way, is the only evidence appellant has cited in its 
Brief) was nearly entirely inadmissible under the terms of 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e). R. 49. However, Utah Mortgage gave 
no indication of a need or desire for additional evidence; 
it apparently had told its side of the story as well as it 
could or, at least, as well as it wanted to. 
The Blacks' position, both in this Court and below, 
is that the One-Action Rule precludes any action to recover 
a debt secured by a real estate mortgage other than through 
foreclosure and deficiency proceedings, unless the security 
has been lost or destroyed without the act or neglect of the 
mortgagee. In this case, the security obviously was lost 
through the act and neglect of Utah Mortgage. Utah Mortgage's 
opposition to the judgment is threefold: that the Blacks 
somehow agreed to appellant's absent-minded releases of the 
collateral (App. Br., pp. 5-10); that Utah Mortgage's "recove!J 
on the promissory note could only be barred if it were 
8 
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negligent in releasing the collateral" (App. Br., p. 5); and 
that Mr. and Mrs. Black, as alleged sureties, are not entitled 
to the protection of the One-Action Rule. App. Br., pp. 17-20. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD 
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS BARRED 
FROM PROCEEDING AGAINST DEFENDANT 
BY REASON OF THE ONE-ACTION RULE. 
1. Utah Mortgage is barred from proceeding 
personally against the Blacks by its 
failure to foreclose on the secured 
property. 
Section 78-37-1 (1976 Repl. Vol.), Utah Code 
Annotated, provides, in pertinent part: 
There can be one action for the 
recovery of any debt or the enforce-
ment of any right secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate which 
action must be in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter •..• 
It repeatedly has been held that the remedy provided by 
Section 78-37-1, its identical predecessor statutes and 
analagous statutes of other states is exclusive and that a 
debt secured by a real estate mortgage may be enforced only 
through foreclosure followed by a deficiency judgment; 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
direct actions against borrowers are prohibited. Stewart 
Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P.2d 276, 281-283 
(1943). Accord, United Growth Corp. v. Kelly, 86 Mich. App. 
82, 272 N.W.2d 340, 343 (1978) (" [M]ortgage foreclosure 
proceedings are strictly statutory and courts are bound by 
statutory provisions." "Mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
are special and statutory, and not an exercise of inherent 
equity power of the Court. ") ; Bi sno v. Sax, 175 Cal. App. 2d 
714, 345 P.2d 814, 819 (1959). The "One-Action Rule" applies 
to enforcement of trust deeds as well as mortgages--an 
unsurprising result, since both instruments are identical as 
a practical matter. E.g., Bank of Italy v. Bentley, 217 
Cal. 644, 658, 20 P.2d 940, 945 (1937); Walker v. Community Bank. 
111 Cal. Rptr. 897, 518 P.2d 329, 331 (1974); Bisno v. Sax, 
supra, 346 P.2d at 819. Cf., Mallory v. Kessler, 18 Utah 
11, 14, 54 Pac. 892 (1898). 
The Rule requires a mortgagee seeking to recover a 
debt secured by real estate first to foreclose on the mortgaged 
property; only in the event of a deficiency may it proceed 
against the mortgagor personally. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-37-1, 
2 (1976 Repl. Vol.). It is well established, under Utah 
law, that "the personal liability of the mortgagor cannot be 
enforced until the [mortgaged] security has been exhausted." 
National Bank of Commerce v. James Pingree Co., 62 Utah 259, 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
218 Pac. 552 (1923), cited in Cache Valley Banking co. v. 
LOgan Lodge, etc., 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936). 
A mortgagee's failure to avail himself of the statutory 
remedy will bar any other remedy. Donaldson v. Grant, 15 
Utah 231, 240-241, 49 Pac. 779 (1897). The only recognized 
exception to the Rule is "where the security has been lost 
through no fault of the mortgagee" and foreclosure obviously 
would be idle and fruitless procedure. Cache Valley Bank of 
Commerce v. Logan Lodge, supra, 56 P.2d at 1049. (In Cache 
Valley Bank of Commerce, plaintiff was a second mortgagee; 
the first mortgagee already had foreclosed upon the land and 
the profits from the foreclosure "were not sufficient to 
satisfy [even] the first mortgage." The land's remaining 
value unquestionably was nil. Id., 56 P.2d at 1049.) That 
exception is available only upon proof that the security, 
through circumstances beyond the mortgagee's control became 
completely valueless. Security First Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 
31 Cal. App. 2d 182, 87 P.2d 724, 726-727 (1929); Cache 
Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge, supra, 56 P.2d at 1049. 
("It was no fault of the plaintiff's that the security for 
its note was lost. The fault is rather with the defendant 
for failing to pay the first mortgage and thus causing it to 
be foreclosed. The plaintiff could not have prevented the 
loss of its security ...• " (emphasis added.)); Bailey v. Hansen, 
11 
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105 Mont. 552, 74 P.2d 438, 440 (1937) (A mortgagee is 
excused from foreclosure only if "the security has become 
valueless through no act of his."). 
The Rule's purpose is to create a regularity and 
predictability in real estate financing. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 
§334, at 700-702 (2d ed. 1970). As the Utah Bankers Association, 
amicus curiae herein, states, the Rule should be applied "to 
avoid frustrating the reasonable expectations of lenders and 
borrowers." Amicus Br., p. 1. The Blacks were ,entitled to 
rely upon Utah Mortgage's competence and care in maintaining 
its collateral after they had deeded their real estate to 
its trustee. The record reveals no evidence--much less 
proof--of the property's destruction or valuelessness in 
this case. Indeed, plaintiff concedes that, even before im-
provement, that the mortgaged property had an appraised 
value, as relatively raw land, of $894,000 (R. 25)--enough 
to satisfy a $675,715 principal amount, with nearly $220,000 
left over for interest. 
If Utah Mortgage lost the security for its loan 
before that loan was paid off, it did so through a voluntary 
reconveyance of the property, not through destruction or 
prior foreclosure. At best, Utah Mortgage can claim only 
that its security was lost through its neglect and inad-
vertence. Such a loss cannot excuse a mortgagee from the 
12 
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one-Action Rule's requirements, as Utah Mortgage admits. 
("Utah Mortgage's ... recovery on the promissory note could 
only be barred if it were negligent in releasing the col-
lateral." App. Br., p.5). This Court held in Donaldson 
v. Grant, supra, 240-241, that a mortgagee who lost his 
1
• security through a failure to make a timely recording was 
barred from proceeding personally against the mortgagor. 
The plaintiff having lost his right 
to foreclose his mortgage on the 
property by his neglect to have its 
assignment to him recorded, the 
further question arises, can he 
maintain his action against Grant, 
the maker of the note, and the 
mortgage to secure it? 
[T]hese can be but one action for 
the recovery of a debt or the 
enforcement of any right secured 
by mortgage upon real estate or 
personal property; that the court 
may direct a sale of the in-
cumbered property •.. and apply 
the proceeds to the payment of 
costs and the amount due the 
plaintiff, and, if it appears ... 
that the proceeds are in-
sufficient, a judgment may be 
docketed for the balance against 
the defendant personally liable 
for the debt .... This section 
requires the property mortgaged 
to be subjected first to the 
payment of the debt, and the 
mortgagee or any assignee of the 
note cannot recover a personal 
judgment unless the proceeds of 
the sale of the property mort-
gaged prove to be insufficient. 
13 
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The Court added: 
"~t may be that if the mortgagor's 
title to the land has become ex-
tinguished subsequent to the 
making of the mortgage, by title 
paramount, or if the mortgaged 
property has been destroyed or 
ceased to exist, the mortgagee 
need not go through the idle form 
of bringing an action for the 
foreclosure before he can have a 
judgment on the note. But, when 
the mortgagee by his own act--or--
neglect deprives himself of the 
right to foreclose the mortgage, 
he at the same time deprives 
himself of the right to an action 
on the note •... " [citation omitted.] 
Id, 15 Utah at 241. Accord, Hibernia Sav. and Loan Co. v. 
Thornton, 109 Cal. 427, 42 Pac. 447, 448 (1895) (holding 
that mortgagee's failure to present a claim in probate 
similarly barred him from personal action) . Appellant does 
not dispute that its claim would be barred if the security 
for the Blacks' loan had been lost through its neglect: (In 
fact, Donaldson states that the mortgagee forfeits its 
rights if the property is lost through its act or neglect. 
Appellant does not--and cannot--dispute that, had 
it kept proper track of the lots which it was releasing, the 
Blacks' indebtedness would have been satisfied from the 
collateral. 
The question before the Court then is whether Utah 
Mortgage's alleged premature release of the collateral 
14 
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constituted an "act or neglect" by it. It appears clear 
that it does. The parameters of the applicable Utah law are 
defined by the Donaldson and Cache Valley Banking Company 
cases, supra. Failure to record a mortgage was an "act er 
neglect" sufficient to defeat a mortgagee's right to proceed 
personally in Donaldson; by contrast, loss of the property 
through paramount title of a prior mortgagee (which the second 
mortgagee obviously could not have prevented) was not sufficient 
to defeat those rights in Cache Valley Banking. 
Utah Mortgage's failure to keep track of its 
property clearly is equivalent to (if not even more extreme) 
than the mortgagee's conduct in Donaldson. The type of loss 
which will not defeat a mortgagee's right to recovery is 
described by McMillan v. United Mortgage Co., 82 Nev. 117, 
412 P.2d 604, 606 (1966): 
[I]f the security, without fault of 
the mortgagee or beneficiary, has 
become valueless as where the 
security has been destroyed by fire 
and other similar situations. 
(Emphasis added.) More pointedly, this Court ruled in Cache 
Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge, supra, 56 P.2d at 1949, that 
the test is whether the mortgagee "could not have prevented the 
loss of its security." Obviously, Utah Mortgage, through its 
trustee, could have prevented the loss. 
Utah Mortgage attempts to exonerate itself from 
15 
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the consequences of its acts by raising something analagous ~ 
a claim of contributory negligence: that even though it was 
negligent, so were the Blacks. That claim simply will not 
wash. First, there is no evidence whatever that the Blacks 
were aware that Utah Mortgage had lost track of its collateral. 
Second, the law is specific that the test is whether the 
property was lost through the "act or neglect" of the mortgagee 
(in the words of Donaldson) or when the mortgagee "could not 
have prevented the loss" (in the words of Cache Valley Banking). 
The law imposes a burden of proper performance 
upon the mortgagee. If it fails in its responsibility, it 
cannot be exonerated by the conduct of some other party. 
Indeed, the rule which Utah Mortgage proposes--without any 
support in the case law--would be grossly unfair. As beneficiar 
of the trust deed, appellant, a large, sophisticated banking 
institution, was uniquely capable of keeping track of its 
collateral. As the court noted in Girard Trust Bank v. O'Neill, 
219 Pa. Super. 363, 281 A.2d 670, 671 (1971), once a bank 
takes control of collateral, as Utah Mortgage had, the borrower 
has no way of ensuring that the collateral will be protected 
in a careful manner. By contrast, Utah Mortgage had ample 
means of ensuring the collateral's integrity. The proper 
rule is clear from a comparison of the cases which have 
disallowed a mortgagee to sue personally (e.g., Donaldson 
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and Hibernia Sav. and Loan Co, supra) with those which have 
allowed it to do so (e.g., Cache Valley Banking, supra, 
First Nat'l Bank, Giddings v. Helwig, 464 S.W.2d 953, 954 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (involving loss of collateral thro~gh 
a fire)): the mortgagee is relieved from its duty to proceed 
by foreclosure only if the property is lost through circum-
stances beyond its control (i.e., where it "could not have 
prevented the loss," in the words of the Cache Valley Banking 
decusion). In the instant case, the mortgaged property's 
release admittedly was completely within Utah Mortgage's 
control. 
Utah Mortgage held the Blacks' property as security 
on a loan which became due on January 1, 1977. More than 
two years after the due date--after allowing its borrowers 
to dispose of whatever proceeds they had received from sale 
of the secured property in the reasonable belief that Utah 
Mortgage had drawn funds necessary to repay the loan--the 
company discovered its error (assuming that there actually 
was a balance due) and sued the Blacks for funds which 
should have been accounted for long ago. Utah Mortgage had 
perpetrated the very kind of mismanagement which the Rule 
penalizes. 
17 
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2. Utah Mortgage cannot excuse its 
apparent loss of collateral by 
reason of the Blacks' alleged 
agreement to its release. 
There is no evidence in the record that the Blacks 
agreed to any release of collateral beyond the provision of 
the trust deed cited at page 6 of Appellant's Brief (Note 
and at 3, supra), which authorized Utah Mortgage to release 
lots at its sole discretion. Certainly, such a provision 
carries with it at least an implied agreement by Utah Mortgage 
to dispose of the collateral in a careful and prudent manner. 
Utah Mortgage in effect is urging that a waiver of plaintiff's 
rights under the One-Action Rule has occurred. However, the 
record reveals no basis for finding a waiver. 
The standard for finding of waiver is explicit. 
A waiver is the intentional re-
linquishment of a known right. To 
constitute a waiver, there must be 
an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage, or knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it. It must be 
distinctly made .•.. 
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 
311-312 (1936). The only agreement between Utah Mortgage 
and the Blacks for the release of lots was the trust deed, 
which gave Utah Mortgage discretion to release the lots as 
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it chose. That agreement certainly neither contains nor 
implies a consent to prematurely surrender the collateral. 
Indeed, had Utah Mortgage implemented what it claims to have 
been its release program--of retaining $5,200.00 or $5,500.00 
4 per lot --the loan would have been discharged with funds to 
spare. Appellant, if its allegations are to be believed, simply 
did not keep track of its property. There is not a shred of 
evidence that this sloppiness was agreed to by the Blacks. 
The trust deed was executed against a background 
of longstanding real estate financing practices: 
A construction loan is the usual 
source of funds with which the 
builder will finance the improve-
ments he will build on the lanq. 
In essence, the construction loan 
is a short-term loan, usually 
secured by a first mortgage or 
deed of trust on the property, 
which will be paid off in full as 
to each lot when the lot is ul-
timately sold to a home buyer. 
4rn fact, there is no competent evidence that the 
Blacks agreed to Utah Mortgage's specific release program. 
The only reference to such an agreement occurring ~n the 
record below is the Anderson affidavit (R. 26), which asserts: 
At the time it made the loan Utah 
Mortgage agreed with the Blacks and 
Black Realty that it would give a 
partial release to individual lots 
in the proposed subdivision upon 
payment of $5,200.00 per lot. :·· 
The release price was later raised 
to $5,500.00. 
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NELSON & WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE 
AND DEVELOPMENT, 553 (1976) (cited at Amicus Curiae's Brief, 
p.2). To suggest that the Blacks agreed to,a waste of the 
collateral when they agreed to a practice which routinely is 
implemented to pay off is utterly untenable speculation. It 
does not amount to a genuine issue of fact which could defeat 
summary judgment. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1094 (5th 
Cir. 1975); reh. denied, 521 F.2d 814 (1975), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 940 (1976); Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug, 149 
F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 1945). 
The cases of consent to a discharge of security 
which appellant has cited (Mono Irr. Co. v. State, 32 Cal. 194, 
162 P.2d 647 (1916); Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Jones, 49 
Utah 519, 164 Pac. 1029 (1917)) involved clear consents to 
specific sales. They are not analogous to the instant case. 
Even if the Blacks had made an agreement by signing 
the trust deed, which was simultaneous with the loan (R. 2, 16) 
which waived the One-Action Rule, such an agreement would be 
void. As was held in Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 138 
P.2d 7, 9 (1943): 
Since necessity often drives debtors 
to make serious concessions when a 
loan is needed, [the One-Action Rule) 
should be applied to protect them and 
to prevent a waiver in advance. 
The affidavit contains no claim of personal knowledge or . 
affirmative showing that Mr. Anderson was competent to testifY 
on the subject of the release. It is inadmissible under UTAH 
R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
20 
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There is no Utah case on the point decided by Salter. The 
California rule is sound and should be applied. 
II. 
MR. AND MRS. BLACK WERE NOT SURETIES 
AND, EVEN IF THEY WERE SURETIES, 
UTAH MORTGAGE'S FAILURE TO FORE-
CLOSE WOULD BAR A CLAIM AGAINST THEM. 
Utah Mortgage as argued that Mr. and Mrs. Black 
signed their note of June 26, 1975 as sureties rather than 
principals. The note upon which plaintiff sues represents Mr. 
and Mrs. Black to be principals, not sureties. It is uni-
versally recognized that "[i]f a note is signed by two or more 
makes, it will be presumed that they are co-makers and liable 
as such, and not as principal and surety." In re Chamberlain's 
Estate, 44 Cal. App. 2d 193, 112 P.2d 53, 57 (1941). Accord, 
Morris' Estate v. Kirby's Estate, 192 Okl. 69, 133 P.2d 896 
(1945). There is no evidence in the record which could 
overcome that presumption. 
Plaintiff seeks to defeat a summary judgment on the 
basis as "issue" of fact which is sheer speculation. Such an 
"issue" may not enter into a summary judgment proceeding. 
Tyler v. Vickery, supra; Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug, 
supra. 
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Even if Mr. and Mrs. Black were sureties, Utah 
Mortgage's release of the collateral would discharge them as 
well as Black Realty. There is indeed authority--although 
it apparently exists only in Nevada (First Nat'l Bank of 
Nevada v. Barengo, 91 Nev. 396, 536 P.2d 487 (1975); ~ 
v. Heers, 366 F. Supp. 851 (D. Nev. 1973))--that a mortgagee 
may proceed directly against a surety, leaving the surety to 
recover against the mortgagor, when the security has not 
been compromised. However, it is universally held that, 
under no circumstances may a mortgagee who has allowed the 
collateral to be wasted recover against the surety. A 
creditor has a duty to a surety to preserve the collateral 
against which the surety may recover if he is required to 
discharge his principal's obligation. Should the creditor 
compromise that collateral, or discharge the principal debt, 
the surety is discharged to the extent of the loss. E.g., 
Inland-Ryerson Const. Co. v. Brazier Const. Co., 7 Wash. App. 
338, 500 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1972); Breckenridge v. Mason, 64 
Cal. Rptr. 201, 207, 256 Cal. App. 2d 121 (1967). The 
Restatement provides: 
Where the creditor has security from the 
principal and knows of the s~ret~'s 
obligation, the surety's obligation is 
reduced pro tanto if the creditor 
(a) surrenders or releases the 
security, or 
{b) wilfully or negligently harms 
it, or 
(c) fails to take reasonable action 
to preserve its value at a time 
when the surety does not have an 
opportunity to take such action. 
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RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) I §132. The rule Of the Re-
statement appears to have been followed in every reported 
decision which involves a compromise of collateral by the 
principal creditor. E. g., O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 
296 N. C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587, 598 (1978); Girard Trust 
Bank v. O'Neill, 219 Pa. Super. 363, 281 A.2d 670, 671 
(1971) (holding that once a bank took control of collateral, 
it must sustain the loss if the collateral was collected in 
a negligent manner); First Nat'l Bank v. Haugen Ford, Inc., 
219 N.W.2d 847, 852 (N. D. 1974); Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. 
v. Reliance Ins. Co., 46 Ill.2d 522, 264 N.E.2d 134, 136 
(1970); Walin v. Young, 181 Ore. 185, 180 P.2d 535, 537 (1947). 
Appellant has offered no reason why the Restatement 
and the rule of numerous jurisdictions should not be followed. 
If Mr. and Mrs. Black were sureties, they should have the same 
rights as all other sureties. 
Finally, appellant's claim of suretyship, not having 
been raised below, is improperly before this Court and should 
be disallowed. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltini Research, 
176 F.2d 799, 809 (1st Cir. 1949). 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S "MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT" PROPERLY WAS DENIED. 
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Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, as the 
record reveals, was untimely filed. Defendant did not have 
time to respond to it on the merits and the Motion should 
have been disregarded in any event. Further, the Motion was 
improper in that it attempted only to defeat certain affirm-
ative defenses and did not seek judgment on a claim of the 
Complaint. The Complaint herein consists of a single claim: 
to recover an alleged debt. It is well established that a 
motion for summary judgment may not seek less than judgment on 
at least one claim of a complaint. It may not be used as a 
device for attacking specific defenses or components of a 
single claim. Marino v. Nevitt, 311 F.2d 406, 408 (3d Cir. 
1962); United States v. Burnett, 262 F.2d 55, 58-59 (9th Cir. 
1958) (disallowing a motion for summary judgment addressed to 
certain items of damages only); Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works, 
Inc., 154 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1946). Finally, the Craig 
Anderson affidavit (R. 25-26), which is the sole evidentiary 
support of the Motion, is inadmissible, as has been discussed 
above. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was improper!) 
taken and was properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not the far-reaching matter which plaintiff 
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and the amicus curiae have characterized it as being. This 
is a case of a large lending institution, through almost 
unbelievable incompetence, forfeiting collateral. It seeks 
now, in disregard of well established rules of law, to make 
its debtors pick up the tab for its failure. No material 
fact concerning the subject transaction is in dispute. 
summary judgment properly was entered below and should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this /f/l day of January, 1980. 
L. S. McCULLOUGH, JR. 
RICARDO B. FERRARI 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake Cit~, Utah 84111 
Attorneys fo7"Defend'n· ~y-
Respondent ,- / ·'/ 
BYµ~~ 
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